Book Review: Belonging to America. by Kenneth Karst. by Robel, Lauren
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1991
Book Review: Belonging to America. by Kenneth
Karst.
Lauren Robel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robel, Lauren, "Book Review: Belonging to America. by Kenneth Karst." (1991). Constitutional Commentary. 617.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/617
1991] BOOK REVIEW 309 
BELONGING TO AMERICA. By Kenneth Karst. 1 New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1989. Pp. xi, 329. 
Cloth, $29.95. 
Lauren Robe/2 
When I was thirteen, my family moved to Montgomery, Ala-
bama. Nothing had prepared us for the South of 1965, and nothing 
in my childhood to that point had prepared me for the rigid hierar-
chies of life in a resentfully mtegrated school. On my first day at 
school, I violated a crucial part of the racial code I had not yet 
learned by eating lunch at a table with an empty seat. After lunch, 
a boy I had never met pulled me aside to tell me that "we" did not 
eat with "them." I was bewildered: who were "we"? I didn't know 
this boy. I was embarrassed: how could I have made a mistake on 
my first day? 
The point of the boy's warning, of course, was to tell me that 
black students didn't belong, and that I wouldn't belong either if I 
didn't learn the rules. I soon found there were many situations like 
this one, and that my white skin did not always make me presump-
tively an insider. My school still started the day's classes with the 
Lord's Prayer, for instance, but this prayer kept going after my 
Catholic training taught me to stop. Should I just go along with my 
classmates' religious practice, or hope that no one noticed if I 
stopped "early"? I was part of the "we" as compared to the few 
black students in my school, but not as compared to my mostly 
Protestant classmates. 
Most Americans have stories like these, and I share mine only 
because they illustrate a central point in Professor Kenneth Karst's 
book, Belonging to America. For children, group membership is an 
integral part of self-definition. The boy who issued my first-day 
warning was incredulous that I didn't know the rules that were sec-
ond nature to him; my embarrassment came from the fear of exclu-
sion. Our group memberships define our places in society; they tell 
us where we belong. Professor Karst argues that such experiences 
are part of an acculturation that results, for most of us, in a way of 
thinking about groups and their members that is so deeply a part of 
our understandings of who we are that we cannot really compre-
hend how it affects our ordinary decisionmaking. When the deci-
sionmakers are judges, or legislators, these beliefs often 
subconsciously affect decisions about burdens of proof in constitu-
I. Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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tiona} cases or the allocation of societal resources that slight the 
interests of members of racial and religious minorities and women 
in being treated as equal citizens. 
In asking who "belongs to America," Karst limns the psycho-
logical borders of our country to describe citizenship from the point 
of view of the outsiders, those citizens historically excluded from 
the country's public life because they belong to disfavored racial, 
ethnic, or religious groups. Karst's project has several parts. The 
first, directed at everyone who thinks seriously about such things as 
race and gender, is an attempt to describe and explain the meaning 
and power of acculturation in America. The second, directed more 
specifically at lawyers and judges, is an argument about what the 
effects of our history and our acculturation should mean for both 
the process of reaching decisions, and the decisions that ought to be 
reached in cases under the fourteenth amendment. The book is 
both an exhortation to our best instincts as a nation and a reminder 
of our worst. It serves as an antidote to the parsimoniousness of our 
public life in the post-Reagan years, and an invitation to share in a 
generosity of spirit that Karst doggedly sees slumbering in America. 
Absent a common religion, devotion to a monarchy, or aneth-
nically homogeneous population, what glue holds this country to-
gether? Professor Karst argues that our national bond is adherence 
to a common "civic culture," a uniquely American blend of polit-
ical beliefs stressing "individualism, egalitarianism, democracy, na-
tionalism, and tolerance of diversity." At the core of this national 
ideology is equality: a rejection of "caste, of rigid social hierarchy 
that traps people in a system that holds them down." 
Americans have always lived with substantial contradictions 
between egalitarian ideals on the one hand and conduct that system-
atically denies the equality of members of certain groups on the 
other. We have done so, Karst argues, by narrowly defining the 
groups to whom our ideals apply. Historically, few groups have 
"belonged to America" in the sense of viewing themselves as "fully 
participating member[s] in the national community." We started 
out, in fact, with only one group with full insider status: white, 
male, Anglo-Saxon Protestants-and they argued among them-
selves about whose brand of Protestantism should prevail. Race, 
ethnicity, language, and religion have all been used to relegate en-
tire groups to subordinate status, which in tum means excluding 
them from political and economic participation in American life. 
The central problem of American constitutional law, given our 
history, is the problem of subordination of groups. As a constitu-
tional theorist, Karst attempts to breathe new life into two con-
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cepts, equality and citizenship, often left for dead in modem 
constitutional theory. Central to Karst's argument is the principle 
of "equal citizenship": "Each individual is presumptively entitled 
to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, 
and participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids 
the organized society to treat an individual as a member of an infer-
ior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant." 
Karst uses the facts of five familiar cases, such as Jefferson v. 
Hackney,J which reached the Supreme Court during the 1970s and 
80s, to underscore the tenacity and power of our acculturated un-
derstandings of the meaning of race and gender and the need for a 
principle such as the one he suggests. In each, a member of a disfa-
vored group has been burdened by government action in a way that 
seems directly attributable either to stereotypical thinking about 
these groups by the relevant government decisionmakers, or by a 
desire to show these people their "place." Nevertheless, their 
claims are rejected by the Supreme Court. How did the Justices 
manage to ignore or find inconsequential the effects of race, religion, 
or gender on what happened to these individuals? And how might 
these effects be profitably explored? 
Karst answers the first question by writing a psychological his-
tory of the relations between insiders and outsiders in America. 
Stigmatizing, the fear of the unknown, and the projection of a nega-
tive identity onto the outgroup, are common to the experience of 
each group Karst discusses. Much of this account, such as the 
chapters on Jim Crow or gender relations, is (or ought to be) famil-
iar terrain for those of us who teach constitutionallaw.4 
Less often tackled by legal scholars is the story of the legal 
barriers to belonging faced by ethnic immigrants. Karst's chapter 
on "nativism" -the legal and social exclusion of the foreign born-
is particularly interesting for the light it sheds on such current is-
sues as movements to legislate English as the national language. 
Similar attempts succeeded during the great waves of immigration 
during the 1800s, when America was at its most xenophobic: Iowa, 
in fact, forbade the use of foreign languages in public and private 
schools, in church services, in conversations in public places, and 
even over the telephone. Karst makes a powerful case for the paral-
lels between that sort of "intercultural domination" and the system 
of Jim Crow, noting that housing and employment discrimination 
3. 406 u.s. 535 (1972). 
4. I think these chapters, in fact, would be enormously useful in the classroom for 
many students unfamiliar with the history of group subordination in this country. I was 
astonished recently when one student expressed in class the view that slavery was a "social 
system," apparently enforced through the good manners of the slaves. 
312 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 8:309 
against ethnic and religious minorities was common during the lat-
ter part of the last century and the first part of this one. 
Ethnic immigrants fought to belong through the political pro-
cess, bloc voting, and political machines that assured their followers 
of a piece of the economic pie. As many writers have noted, Ameri-
can politics has been much more resistant to the claims of black 
citizens, who turned instead to the judiciary. 
Woven into Karst's history are various Supreme Court deci-
sions that involve race, gender and ethnicity. The Court's perform-
ance, overall, has not been impressive. While Karst begins with the 
stunning case of Brown v. Board of Education, and finds good words 
for the Warren court's state action cases, the more frequent exam-
ples are of the Court's failures, from Dred Scott through Washing-
ton v. Davis. Would Karst's equal citizenship principle help judges 
take better account of the effects of racist and sexist acculturation? 
Well, it would if judges could be convinced to follow Karst's 
methodology. Karst joins a chorus of voicess encouraging judges to 
think about the meaning an outsider would place on a government 
actor's behavior. Karst is particularly effective in demonstrating 
how changing perspective can open new avenues for thinking about 
familiar cases. For instance, he encourages us to think about what 
meaning Ruth Jefferson, a black woman on welfare and the named 
plaintiff in Jefferson v. Hackney, would attribute to the Texas legis-
lature's decision to economize by cutting her benefits to half of the 
state's own assessment of what she needed to survive, while leaving 
untouched the benefits of the elderly poor-most of whom were 
white. 
Karst also encourages judges to think about the historical and 
institutional contexts of the cases they decide. In writing about the 
illegitimacy cases, for example, Karst notes that in Louisiana, 
where the first of the illegitimacy cases considered by the Court be-
gan, 6 "the legal disabilities associated with illegitimacy grew out of 
that society's history of race relations." The legal status of illegiti-
macy not only allowed men's wealth and status to attach to women 
and their children only when men chose to recognize the union or 
the children, but also allowed white men to perpetuate the stigma 
associated with race without having to be tainted by the existence of 
their own black children. By placing legitimacy laws in their histor-
5. See, e.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Law-
rence, The I d. The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 30 STAN. 
L. REV. 317 (1987); Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
6. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
1991) BOOK REVIEW 313 
ical context, Karst illuminates their connection to the creation of a 
system of caste. 
Having given judges the tools to work with, Karst renews the 
argument for the centrality of the federal judiciary, and particularly 
the Supreme Court, in remedying the hurt of exclusion. Judicial 
enforcement of the equal citizenship principle vindicates the central 
tenets of the American civic culture, invites outsiders into the na-
tional community, and promotes the national good by assuring that 
no group is a permanent loser in the political process. 
As we begin the 1990s, this prescription seems hauntingly sad. 
A court that could tell Native Americans that their religious prac-
tices (and everyone else's, for that matter) were the proper subject 
of political brokering7 is an unlikely candidate for spiritual leader in 
the quest for constitutional equality. But as Karst himself points 
out, the strength of the judicial commitment to equality has never 
been the measure of its pull on American consciousness--else how 
could Brown v. Board ever have come about? Perhaps, then, we 
should view Belonging to America as an eloquent reminder of the 
importance of thinking seriously about equality, even if our judges 
will not. 
GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, 
AND LAW. By Richard D. Mohr.1 New York, NY: Colum-
bia University Press. 1988. Pp. 357. Cloth $39.00; paper 
$14.00. 
Harry V. Jaffa 2 
The author is-we are told by the dust jacket- an "openly gay 
professor" who has turned his attention 
to the lives of gay people in America and to the ethical issues raised by society's 
perception and treatment of gays. 
This "timely book," it is said, 
will prompt Americans to consider whether they have consistently applied their 
basic values to lesbians and gays. 
7. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 
(1990). 
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